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Unfair Representation as an Unfair Labor Practice 
In its 1962 Miranda Fuel Co. decision,1 the National Labor Re-
lations Board formulated a novel doctrine whereby it acquired 
1. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See note 8 infra and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction over unfair representation complaints filed by union 
members in good standing on the theory that a union which fails to 
represent all of its members fairly commits unfair labor practices in 
violation of sections 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act.2 Formerly, unfair representation complaints filed by 
union members had been cognizable only by the courts, 3 since unfair 
representation was not considered an unfair labor practice and, 
consequently, was outside the jurisdiction of the NLRB.' 
Section 8(b)(l)(A) provides that it shall be an unfair labor 
practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of 
their section 7 rights "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing 
. . . or to refrain from any or all such activities." Since a labor orga-
nization is charged with the duty of acting as bargaining agent for all 
employees in the bargaining unit, nonunion as well as union 
workers,5 arbitrarily inequitable treatment of unaffiliated workers 
constitutes the archetypal section 8(b)(l)(A) violation.6 This form of 
unfair representation impinges on a worker's right to remain un-
affiliated, but in Miranda the Board was presented with the allegedly 
unfair representation of a union member in good standing. Never-
theless, the Board, 7 having determined that the union had acted 
arbitrarily and unfairly in successfully urging the employer to reduce 
the seniority of the complainant, found a section 8(b)(l)(A) viola-
tion by interpreting the section 7 right to choose representatives as 
implicitly including the right of union employees to be represented 
fairly. 
Section 8(b)(2) is violated when a union causes or attempts to 
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in such a 
manner as to encourage or discourage union membership or partici-
2. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1958) 
(Taft-Hardey Act). 
3. The right to fair representation was judicially extracted from § 9(a) of the act. 
See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 
330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Whitfield v. United Steel-
workers, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); Syres v. Oil Workers, 
223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1955). But cf. Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 
195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961). See generally Herring, The "Fair Rep-resenta• 
tion" Doctrine-An Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 
Mo. L. REv. 113 (1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1964). 
4. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 49 Stat. 553 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958), 
provides that the NLRB shall have jurisdiction over unfair labor practices listed in 
§ 8, 49 Stat. 552 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 
V, 1964), affecting commerce. 
5. This obligation derives from § 9 of the NLRA, which provides that the 
statutory bargaining agent shall be the exclusive employee representative. See, e.g., 
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 
F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945). 
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Hughes Tool Co. v. 
NLRB, supra note 5. 
7. Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissented. 
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pation in union activities.8 An employer is prohibited from so dis-
criminating by section 8(a)(3). Although Miranda involved a union 
member in good standing, the Board, finding the union's action to 
be unjustified and arbitrary, held the successful insistence that the 
seniority of one of its members be reduced was an 8(b)(2) violation 
on the theory that this demonstration of the ability of the union to 
wield arbitrary power would force nonmembers, or members in poor 
standing, to take an active part in union affairs in order to avoid 
incurring union hostility.9 
On review, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's decision in Miranda, Judge 
Friendly dissenting.10 Judge Medina, writing the majority opinion, 
was joined by Judge Lumbard in determining that the union had 
not acted unfairly. The decision also considered and rejected the 
section 8(b)(2)-section 8(a)(3) reasoning.11 Judge Medina alone con- . 
sidered, and rejected, the section 8(b)(l)(A) unfair representation 
rationale. 
Nevertheless, the NLRB reiterated these theories in 1964 in 
Hughes Tool Company12. in the context of racially-oriented dis-
criminatory union inaction. The bargaining unit at Hughes Tool 
was divided between white and Negro employees into locals I and 2. 
At the time these locals were certified as joint bargaining agents,13 
a contract in force between the employer and the two locals provided 
that certain jobs, including apprenticeships, would be available to 
white employees only. When local 2, the Negro unit, refused to 
renew this discriminatory contract, local I did so unilaterally. Sub-
sequently, a Negro member of local 2 applied for an apprenticeship 
but was rejected on the basis of race. The company refused to hear a 
grievance based on this refusal filed through local 2, which according 
to the contract had no responsibity in matters relating to apprentice-
ships. The complainant then sought the assistance of local I in proc-
essing the grievance but was summarily refused, and an unfair 
representation complaint against the union followed because of the 
denial of assistance by local I. 
The presence of two locals within one bargaining unit opened 
8. See, e.g:, Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 52 (1954). 
9. 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 186-88 (1962). 
10. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). 
11. The court determined that § 8(b)(2} could not be violated unless the dis-
crimination sought by the union would constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3) if the 
employer had acted on his own initiative. This reasoning may not encompass all 
situations. See notes 34-36 infra and accompanying text. 
12. Metal Workers, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964). 
13. Apparently this segregated unit had been so certified by the NLRB, because 
in the course of its decision the Board expressly overruled previous decisions insofar 
as they held that unions which practice racial segregation may obtain or retain 
certification. Id. at 1294. 
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two avenues of approach to the case. If the two locals were viewed as 
separate entities, then the refusal of local 1 to process complainant's 
grievance on the ground that only members of local 1 were eligible 
for apprenticeships constituted a refusal to represent a nonmember 
employee in its bargaining unit. The two members of the Board 
who had dissented in Miranda chose this approach to find a section 
S(b)(l)(A) violation in Hughes Tool. The Board majority, on the 
other hand, did not recognize the validity of the division of the 
bargaining unit along racial lines.14 In their view, rather, the case 
presented an instance of internal union discrimination in violation 
of section 8(b)(l)(A) under the Miranda unfair representation 
theory. The majority then broadened the section 8(b)(2) theory of 
Miranda. While Miranda condemned certain union action (insist-
ence upon decreasing the seniority of a member), Hughes Tool 
held that union inaction (the refusal to process a meritorious 
grievance)15 caused the employer to violate section 8(a)(3).16 Finally, 
the Board also added a section 8(b)(3) union refusal to bargain 
violation to the list of unfair labor practices which may arise from 
unfair representation. The Board reasoned that the duty to bargain 
imposed on unions by that section ran in favor of individual mem-
bers, as well as employers, and therefore failure to represent a mem-
ber constituted a refusal to bargain. 
Valid criticism can certainly be advanced against each of the find-
ings of violation made by the Board in Hughes Tool. Because of the 
legislative and administrative history of section S(b)(l)(A), it is un-
likely that the courts will uphold the broad reading given that 
section by the Board when it fashioned the Miranda doctrine as 
reiterated in Hughes Tool.17 Initially, there is no indication that 
Congress intended to include unfair representation within the ambit 
of section 8 unfair labor practices. On the contrary, specific proposals 
14. See note I!! supra. 
15. Not all grievances need be pressed by the union, but the exercise of discretion 
must not be totally arbitrary. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 
31!! F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. 
Md. 1959). 
16. Although the language of the opinion leaves some doubt as to whether, for 
purposes of finding a § 8(b)(2) violation, the majority viewed the locals separately 
or as comprising a single unit, a more recent decision indicates that the existence of 
two locals was immaterial. Rubber Workers Union, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964). 
17. The Courts have construed § S(b)(l)(A) broadly so as to include a wide range 
of conduct. Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960); Radio Officers v. 
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. United Packinghouse Workers, 274 F.2d 816 
(5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Woodworkers, 243 F.2d 745 (5th 
Cir. 1957). See also Central Mass. Joint Bd., 123 N.L.R.B. 590 (1959). However, the 
courts have also defined limits for the provisions of that section. NLRB v. News 
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961) (preferential hiring of union men); Local 357, 
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (hiring hall arrangement not 
~~~~~~-~~~~~•~m~ 
(minority union picketing for recoguition of exclusive bargaining agent). 
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to that end were rejected during consideration of the Taft-Hartley 
Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act, and when presented in separate bills 
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 In addition, because the Taft-
Hartley Act both added section 8(b)(l)(A) to the NLRA and 
amended section 7 to include as a protected right the option to re-
frain from participating in any activity protected by that section, 
the proscription of 8(b)(l)(A) on unions was apparently simply a 
counterpart to the existing section 8(a)(I) of the Wagner Act, which 
imposes the same hands-off limitation on employers. Moreover, if 
the duty of fairness is read into the other section 7 rights as the 
Board read it into the right of employees to choose their own 
representatives, much of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act is redundant,19 with the result 
that, although that act specifically designated the courts to hear 
complaints arising under it,20 the Board will be given almost 
concurrent jurisdiction. Many commentators have agreed that 
the Board's interpretation of section 8(b)(l)(A) is unwarranted,21 
and prior to !Jfiranda the Board's General Counsel had expressed 
the same belief in refusing to present unfair representation cases to 
the Board.22 A bill recently introduced in Congress by Representa-
tive Griffin also appears to assume that unfair representation is not 
presently an unfair labor practice. This bill, entitled "Employee 
Civil Rights Act of 1965,"23 was prompted by current enthusiasm for 
repeal of legislation enabling states to pass right to work laws and 
is intended to guarantee that workers who are required to join a 
union as a condition of employment will not be discriminated 
against by that union on the basis of race. It provides specifically 
that it is to be an unfair labor practice for a union to represent un-
fairly its members because of racial considerations.24 
Second, the position that unfair representation constitutes a 
refusal to bargain by the union is subject to similar objection since 
it seems clear that section 8(b)(3) was designed only as a counterpart 
18. See generally Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 721 (1964).· 
19. LMRDA (Bill of Rights), §§ 101-05, 73 Stat. 522-23 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 4II-15 
(Supp. V, 1964). See generally Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 547, 588-89 
(1963). 
20. 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. V. 1964). 
21. Albert, supra note 19, at 549-52; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 
VILL. L. REv. 151, 153 (1957); Herring, supra note 3; Maloney, Racial and Religious 
Discrimination in Employment and the Role of the NLRB, 21 Mo. L. REv. 219, 230-31 
(1961); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 
CoLUM. L. REv. 563, 590-94 (1962). But see Sovern, Race Discrimination and the NLRA, 
N.Y.U. 16TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (1963). 
22. Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1956); Case No. 1047, 35 L.R.R.M. 1130 
(1954); see also Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 
345 U.S. 330 (1953). 
23. Employee Civil Rights Act of 1965, H.R. 4350, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
24. Ibid, See Ill CONG. REc. 1993 (Feb. 4, 1965). 
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to section 8(a)(5), which requires employers to bargain with unions.25 
Both sections should be read in conjunction with section S(d), which 
defines "to bargain collectively" as the mutual obligation of em-
ployers and unions to meet in good faith to work out differences.26 
Presumably, union insistence upon discriminatory conditions in a 
colle_ctive bargaining agreement would violate the union's duty to 
bargain since it would be a demand for violation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,27 and, perhaps, even without resort to the Civil Rights 
Act it would constitute an illegal bargaining technique.28 The viola-
tion would not, however, stem from unfair representation. The 
Hughes Tool trial examiner, whose opinion was adopted by the 
Board, arrived at his finding of an 8(b)(3) duty running to individual 
members by analogizing to a case which he felt established an em-
ployer's duty under section 8(a)(5) to bargain with individuals as 
well as the union.29 That case, however, was concerned only with the 
fact that a union need not be certified to be a recognized bargaining 
agent30 and does not support the examiner's position. Indeed, there 
are severe limitations on the ability of an individual to bargain with 
his employer,31 and an employer's willingness to bargain with an 
individual employee in the face of these limitations may itself con-
stitute an unfair labor practice.32 Moreover, even if an employee 
were to bargain individually, he could not compel an employer to 
meet with him.aa 
Finally, the Board's contention that a union attempt to cause 
an employer to discriminate against a union member in good stand-
ing violates section 8(b)(2) is unlikely to weather judicial review, 
despite its apparent logic. The Board recognized in Miranda that 
the union's conduct would violate section 8(b)(2) only if the action 
taken by the employer at the union's urging violated section 8(a)(3). 
The Board also recognized that an employer's motive to encourage 
25. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 'F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1963). 
26. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486-88 (1960). 
27. See notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text. 
28. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Sovern, supra note 21, 
at 589. 
29. Louisville Ref. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844, 860-61, enforced, NLRB v. Louisville 
Ref. Co., 102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1939). 
30. See also, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 
(1961). 
31. Two provisos to § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958), permit an employee to 
take his grievances directly to the employer only if the bargaining agent has first 
had an opportunity to present the grievance, and then only if the terms of the 
collective bargaining contract permit such direct bargaining. See J. I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
32. Cf. Federal Tel. &: Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 649 (1953). 
33. See administrative rulings of the NLRB General Counsel: Case No. 418, 31 
L.R.R.M. 1039 (1952); Case No. 317, 30 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1952); Case No. 255, 29 
L.R.R.M. 1339 (1952). 
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or discourage union membership is requisite to a section 8(a)(3) 
unfair labor practice. Further, it was established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Radio Officers v. NLRB34 that this motive 
may be inferred where, in the absence of a valid business reason for 
the inequitable treatment, the circumstances indicate that the fore-
seeable result of the employer's discrimination will be to influence 
union membership.35 The Supreme Court also stated that any ar-
bitrary treatment of employees at the urging of the union would 
naturally tend to have that effect, since it would demonstrate the 
power of the union.36 Radio Officers, therefore, established that an 
act, which if done by the employer on his own initiative might not 
violate section 8(a)(3), may become a violation simply because the 
employer had acquiesced in an arbitrary union demand. In Miranda 
the Board found as a fact that the union's demand was unjustifiable, 
and reasoned that the employer's acquiescence brought the case 
within Radio Officers. 
The nature of this inference made by the Board, however, differs 
from that drawn in Radio Officers. In that case and companion 
cases,37 it was patently clear that the union was urging discrimination 
in order to coerce employees to join the union or to perform sup-
posed obligations of membership.38 The effects of the urged inequi-
ties were also easily ascertainable since in one instance the union 
obtained a higher pay scale for union workers than for other em-
ployees;39 in another instance the seniority of a member was reduced 
for failure to remit union dues;40 and in the third case the union 
successfully sought the discharge of a member who allegedly had not 
complied with certain union rules and procedures.41 Since the 
various employers had no reasonable business purpose for discrimi-
nating, and since they were, or should have been, aware of the 
union's illegal purpose in making the demand and its obvious impact 
on the workers, they were deemed to have intended the foreseeable 
consequences of their conduct. In effect, the clearly culpable union 
motive was imputed to the employer. In Miranda, however, not only 
is the illegal coercive effect of inequitable treatment of a union mem-
ber in good standing conceptually speculative, but also the Board had 
to indulge in drawing an inference from an inference by first inferring 
a culpable union motive and then inferring that the employer was 
aware of that motive. The courts, at least, have generally been un-
!14. !147 U.S. 17 (1954). 
!15. Id. at 45. 
!16. Id. at 52. 
!17. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Gaynor News 
Co. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
38. Id. at 52. 
39. Gaynor News Co. v. NLRB, supra note 37. 
40. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
41. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
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willing to find a section 8(a)(3) violation by inference unless the in-
equitable treatment is reasonably likely to coerce union membership 
and there is no other reasonable conclusion but that it was intended 
to do so.42 No such finding can be confidently asserted in Hughes 
Tool. Finally, in a case such as Hughes Tool, where the employer has 
taken no action violative in itself of section 8(a)(3) and the union has 
urged nothing, there is certainly no justifiable basis for finding an 
8(b )(2) infraction. 
Isolated instances of unfair representation such as that alleged 
in Miranda have not elicited public concern and, indeed, no similar 
case has been heard; but several subsequent racial discrimination 
cases have come before the Board.43 Wholesale discrimination 
against a significant proportion of the labor force on racial grounds 
has prompted specific congressional response in the form of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,44 which imposes the duty of fair 
employment practice on both employers and labor organizations. 
T-he act forbids labor organizations to discriminate, to limit employ-
ment opportunities, or to affect adversely the employment status of 
any member on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, or to attempt to cause an employer so to discriminate. In 
order to insure effective enforcement, the act also affords grievants 
the same advantages of flexibility and minimal cost which NLRB 
hearings have over normal court proceedings,45 subject to the pro-
vision that appropriate state and local authorities shall be accorded 
the opportunity to act before the commencement of federal action.40 
A Fair Employment Opportunity Commission has been established 
with powers to investigate, to seek settlement through conciliation, 
and to file complaints with the offending organization either on the 
Commission's own initiative or on behalf of a complaining party. If 
efforts to achieve an amicable settlement fail, an aggrieved person 
may file suit in federal court, with the aid of appointed counsel and 
without cost in appropriate circumstances.47 The remedies available 
42. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); NLRB v. Adams 
Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1964), vacated, 85 Sup. Ct. 613 (1965), Comment, 32 
U. Cm. L. REv. 124 (1964). 
43. Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964); Automobile Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 
1298 (1964); Locals 1367 & 1368 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1964). 
44. 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
45. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism, 61 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 1435, 1514 (1962); Herring, supra note 3, at 162-63. 
46. This provision, although laudable as an attempt to preserve state remedial 
procedures, has the drawback of delaying the implementation of Title VII actions 
in the instances where they are most needed-where state and local authorities are 
ineffective. 
47. However, because of the limited circumstances in which costs are recoverable, 
the heavy financial burden on the plaintiff makes a Board remedy preferable in 
this respect. Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of NAACP, N.Y. Times, July 3, 
1964, p. 1, col. 6. On the other hand, the Attorney General may be permitted to 
intervene in private actions upon certification that they involve matters of general 
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through the courts are the same as those available through the 
NLRB: injunction and appropriate affirmative relief, including rein-
statement with or without back pay, and the Commission is em-
powered to sue for enforcement where necessary. 
The Civil Rights Act has specifically designated the federal 
courts as the proper forum to hear Title VII actions and it is un-
likely that concurrent jurisdiction in the Board was contemplated.48 
Moreover, no court action may be instituted until the state fair 
employment agencies have been afforded an opportunity to remedy 
the alleged discrimination. This endeavor to preserve the efficacy 
of state fair employment practice laws will be seriously jeopardized 
if the NLRB is permitted to assume jurisdiction of unfair repre-
sentation complaints, since the Garmon rule49 establishes, as a con-
stitutional pre-emption principle, that a case involving conduct 
"arguably" protected or prohibited by the NLRA must initially be 
heard by the NLRB to the exclusion of state courts and state law.50 
The Civil Rights Act will not, of course, encompass a Miranda 
situation. Congress, however, has not acted to make the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements reviewable by the Board,51 but 
rather has expressly chosen to avoid federal interference in internal 
union affairs and to allow a wide range of discretion to bargaining 
agents.52 Therefore, whether the alleged unfair representation of a 
union member in good standing results from affirmative union ac-
tion or from union inaction, or whether the discrimination springs 
from racism or from personal animosity, the Board's usurpation of 
the legislative function should not stand. 
public importance, or he may bring his own suit when he has reason to believe 
that rights guaranteed under Title vn are being violated without redress. 
48. Contra, Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964). 
49. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 286 (1959). 
50. Because of the holding in Hughes Tool, a New York court has applied the 
Garmon rule in holding that a state court no longer has jurisdiction over unfair 
representation cases. Goni-Moral v. Marley, 58 L.R.R.M. 2087 (1964). 
51. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 861 U.S. 477, 486-88 (1960). 
52. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 845 U.S. 830 (1953); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 
295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). That the injection of the NLRB more directly into 
the bargaining process on the Hughes Tool theory will tend to restrict the baigain-
ing agent's discretion is evident from the decision in Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 
1585 (1964), wherein the Board found that the union had exceeded its discretionary 
privilege not only in refusing to discuss better job opportunity for Negroes, but also 
in :refusing to process a grievance relating to segregated washrooms. 
